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The Political Economy of Brexit and the Future of British Capitalism 
Second symposium 
 
Charlie Dannreuther (University of Leeds) 
Scott Lavery (University of Sheffield) 
Lucia Quaglia (University of Bologna)  
 
As we write this introduction in May 2018, more than a year on from the invocation of 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, and half way to the deadline of 2019, much 
remains unclear about the process of the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
European Union (EU) - the so-called Brexit. This is a fluid stage of a complex set of 
negotiations, during a period of political and economic transformation, at a point when the 
very meaning of Britain is under debate. Yet, Brexit also reveals new insights into the 
political economy of Britain and the future of British capitalism. Britain has a distinctive 
µEXVLQHVV PRGHO¶ organised around a dominant financial sector, a flexible labour market, 
service-sector led growth and openness to international capital flows (see Lavery, Quaglia, 
and Dannreuther (2018) PREVIOUS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF>).  
 
In the previous sister symposium (<PREVIOUS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE 
DETAILS AT PROOF), we focused on the impact of Brexit for the international orientation 
of British capitalism. Papers on finance (James and Quaglia, <PREVIOUS ISSUE: 
PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>), the balance of payments 
(Perraton and Spreafico <PREVIOUS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS 
AT PROOF>) and the labour market (Lindstrom <PREVIOUS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO 
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ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) highlighted the specific challenges facing the 
British political system in addressing the complexities of leaving the EU. In this symposium, 
we examine the domestic political economy concerns related to Brexit, which present equally 
interesting challenges as well as new insights. Specifically, authors discuss the increasing 
politicisation of long settled British growth models (Rosamond, <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER 
TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) and how emotion informs technical decisions 
on trade (Siles Brugge <THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT 
PROOF>). The papers in this symposium contribute to a better understanding of how British 
capitalism operates and highlight new avenues of political economy research. The two 
symposia draw on papers from two workshops in a series FDOOHG µ%ULWDLQ DQG (XURSH 7KH
3ROLWLFDO (FRQRP\ RI %UH[LW¶ IXQGHG E\ WKH :KLWH 5RVH &RQVRUWLXP. The papers were 
substantially revised, reviewed and updated in 2017 and 2018. 
 
Overview of the second symposium: Brexit and the reproduction of British capitalism 
 
The UK political system has demonstrated remarkable resilience during the course of the 
Brexit process. The election called by Theresa May in June 2017, and the surprise gains for 
the Labour party, demonstrated that governments with apparently unassailable polling leads 
could still be put under pressure by the electorate. Despite a clear lack of coherence in 
positions within the main political parties, let alone the cabinet, the Government was able to 
create an administration coherent enough to allow Brexit negotiations with the EU to begin 
and continue (Bulmer and Quaglia 2018). Whether this has been or will become a successful 
strategy is moot. While the plummeting of sterling indicated a lack of market confidence in 
the Referendum result, and a series of housing, health, defence, and local authority funding 
crises have underlined the challenges facing the UK even before leaving the EU, the core 
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executive involved in Brexit negotiations retain strong popular support for their position. 
High levels of employment, a consensus to honour the outcome of the Referendum and an 
ability to match the Commission negotiators¶ demands with abstract intentions rather than 
policy details, has allowed May and Davies to retain control.  Somehow, the British state has 
reproduced itself, despite Brexit. Yet, significant tensions and changes have begun to emerge 
during, and partly as a consequence of, the Brexit process (see Gamble 2018).  
 
The papers included in this symposium illustrate how political economy can capture complex 
shifts in power during periods of structural change. The first paper by Ben Rosamond (<THIS 
ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD /UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) presents Brexit as the 
re-politicisation of the debate over the British growth model. These debates have been 
dormant since the 1980s but, as the future has been caught in the µideological swirl¶ of 
debating Brexit, a number of key issues have come to the fore. Since the settled consensus of 
privatised Keynesianism came unstuck in the financial crash of 2008, political parties have 
vied to present credible growth strategies. Old political cleavages have persisted in both 
society, between liberal finance and popular voters, and political parties, where discord in the 
Conservative party has confirmed long standing divisions over European policy. Whereas 
WKHVHWHQVLRQVPD\KDYHEHHQWHPSHUHGLQWKHSDVWE\(XURSH¶VVWDEOHLQIOXHQFHRQeconomic 
growth, social policy and democratic participation, Brexit has laid them bare once again. The 
conflict between markets and democracy needs resolution once more.  
 
In the second paper, Gabriel Siles-Brügge (<THIS ISSUE: PUBLISHER TO ADD 
/UPDATE DETAILS AT PROOF>) challenges the association between Brexit and post truth 
politics by revealing the emotional underpinnings of competing expertise in trade strategies. 
The distance between emotion and cognition, often supressed in trade debates dominated by 
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econometricians and lawyers, offers a space to explore how affect influences even the most 
rigorous of policy debates. This space offers an opportunity for policy leadership by new 
actors like the Legatum Institute whose focus on protecting free market competition has 
offered an alteUQDWLYHWRWKH7UHDVXU\¶VVtate-of-the-art Gravity models. A view of trade based 
on shared principles, rather than technical justifications, has had a powerful effect by 
advocating trade as based on mutual recognition, rather than modelled outcomes. Expert 
knowledge, it appears, depends on its emotional appeal.  
 
What we can learn from Brexit 
 
A strong constructivist thread runs through the papers in this symposium: the British business 
model sits transient atop breaking compromises and expert knowledge needs emotion to be 
realised. In part, this derives from the institutionalist methods shared in the papers to capture 
the temporal and contingent complexities of Brexit (Thompson 2017). The exercise of power 
is translated into action through various devices, such as the transmission of ideas, the 
emotional connection ideologies can offer and the anger of being set apart from the 
mainstream. None of them are material in their explanations of Brexit, but each recognises 
that the material matters in sometimes surprising ways ± gravity models privilege distance, 
and history runs deep in the Conservative party.  While history informs each of the 
contributions, in none does it determine the relations that inform the positions and provisions 
of Brexit. 
 
The political spectacle of Brexit was therefore central (Hozic & True 2017).  Siles-Brügge¶V 
piece confirms this by demonstrating how technocratic debates at the heart of government, 
are based on clearly different political assumptions concerning trade. Rosamond¶V 
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examination of economic models confirms that splits in the Conservative party continue to 
expose deep existential divisions that have persisted within the Conservative party for many 
years.  In each case, Brexit gives extra weight to the expression of opposition in the 
Referendum campaign, the need for a new economic model or the stakes involved in trade 
negotiations. Yet, for each, Brexit is also the culmination of entrenched practices in political 
parties, and elite trade debates. The extent to which these pasts are informative of the future is 
in each case unclear. Is the new uncertainty therefore the consequence of a low growth EU, or 
the weakening of democratic and social agendas, as Rosamond suggests? Or has the mystique 
of rational administration finally been shattered in the emotive strategies of the Brexit trade 
negotiations?  In short, if Brexit signals the end of the UK in the EU, what kind of change 
does it imply for the British state?  
 
Each author locates their analysis in different dimensions of power. Whether the tight circle 
of intense trade negotiations, the conventions and beliefs of the Conservative party, or the 
dispersed weakened support for an exclusive state finally given voice in the Referendum. 
These locations reveal different perspectives, but all present the UK as a state at a cross road.  
Brexit poses major challenges and opportunities to the British variety of capitalism. Several 
economic sectors - such as finance, labour market, trade - EHQHILWWHGIURP8.¶VPHPEHUVKLS
of the EU, as highlighted by several papers in the two Brexit symposia. Following its 
departure from the EU, the UK enters unchartered waters, but this might also open up new 
opportunities for a re-orientation of the British business model.  
 
Prospects post Brexit 
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With all the usual caveats, we can infer some of the implications of BREXIT for Britain and 
the EU. The shared constructivism of these pieces implies institutions help us to study 
conflict (Hay 2016). What, in other words, does it mean to be British and/or European after 
Brexit? The Referendum debate raised this issue, not least in the various pDUWLHV¶ focus on 
immigration. It also raised the issue of how far individual voters react to the lead of the 
political authorities that lead them. These debates have taken on an immediacy for those 
living in Britain hailing from other EU member states, those living in other member states 
hailing from Britain, and those within Britain hailing from states that came to be British. 
Such identity issues have created enormous tensions for the formal political, legal and 
economic institutions that have governed British politics for many decades (Chalmers 2017). 
Political identities based on modern signifiers (e.g. nation, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, place) 
have been problematized during the course of the Brexit debate, so could be reframed. 
Certainly, it raises important challenges for students of comparative politics and international 
relations (Farrell &  Newman 2017) 
 
If Brexit did not necessarily invoke a µpost truth¶ politics, it has at least encouraged us to 
think about our assumptions of rationality in political decision making and of the meaning of 
evidence in evidence based policy, especially in political economy.  While the institutionalist 
agenda was highly productive in EU and UK political studies, the knowledges that were 
bounded by rules and myths was more often benchmarked against modern standards (eg 
rigour, repetition, predictability). But debates over Brexit have demonstrated how parochial 
evidence can be, and how arbitrarily rigour can be applied. Brexit therefore raises questions 
over what knowledge is possible and the political limits of such claims?  
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